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Mitchell and Tetlock: Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos

FACTS DO MATTER: A REPLY TO BAGENSTOS
Gregory Mitchell*
PhilipE. Tetlock**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the ink had dried on our critical assessment of new
empirical research on implicit bias,' Professor Samuel Bagenstos had
critiqued our critique. 2 Unfortunately, Bagenstos resorted to an old
rhetorical gambit: refute a caricature of an opponent's position rather
than the real thing. If Bagenstos were to be believed, we took the
position that the "the law should prohibit only discrimination that results
from self-conscious, irrational animus ''3 and that "rational discrimination
is not a proper target of antidiscrimination law. ' 4 Having attributed this
extreme position to us, it is no wonder that Bagenstos concludes that our
arguments will "resonate strongly" with those who believe
"antidiscrimination law should aim solely at punishing individuals who
act on irrational racist and sexist animus" but "will be far less relevant"
to those who see discrimination as "a social problem that entrenches the
subordinated and disadvantaged status of particular, socially salient
groups."5

* Daniel Caplin Professor of Law & E. James Kelly, Jr.-Class of 1965 Research Professor,
University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie Road, Charlottesville, Va. 22903-1738,
gregmitchell@virginia.edu. We appreciate helpful comments on an earlier draft by John Monahan,
George Rutherglen, Rip Verkeke, Larry Walker, and Amy Wax.
** Lorraine Tyson Mitchell Chair of Organizational Behavior, Haas School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, Cal. 94720-1900, with formal affiliations with the
psychology and political science departments; tetlock@haas.berkeley.edu.
1. See generally Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
2. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science, " and Antidiscrimination
Law, I HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 477 (2007). We sent a draft of this Article to Professor Bagenstos,
but he never responded to our message seeking his input.
3. Id. at 480.
4. Id. at 488.
5. Id. at 490.
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Bagenstos is not alone in his misreading of our article. Professors
Lane, Kang, and Banaji recently dismissed our article as a "predictable
political backlash" to the far-ranging policy implications of implicit bias
research, 6 and Professors Benforado and Hanson likewise described our
article as part of a "backlash" against the implications of this research
that supposedly threatens cherished but incorrect views about human
nature.7 We suspect that misunderstandings of this magnitude could have
arisen only if we were singularly inept in articulating our own position
or if our scholarly adversaries were singularly determined to discredit
our position by portraying it as far more extreme than it is. Not
surprisingly, we favor the second interpretation-and we present in this
reply to our critics, particularly Professor Bagenstos, evidence to support
our interpretation. In the process, we make clear why legal scholars of
any prescriptive bent should care about the unresolved empirical
questions swirling round the concept of implicit bias.
It is our view that the legal community is under no obligation to
agree when a segment of the psychological research community labels
the vast majority of the American population unconsciously prejudiced
on the basis of millisecond reaction-time differentials on computerized
tests. 8 It is our view that the legal community should require evidence
that scores on these tests of "unconscious prejudice" map in replicable
functional forms onto tendencies to discriminate in realistic settings and
that proposed remedies actually work before making wholesale changes
to antidiscrimination law and policy. And it is our view that
scientifically-informed public policy requires critically scrutinizing
knowledge claims, not passively acquiescing to the latest shifts in
intellectual fashions in carefully selected sub-fields of the notoriously
fragmented social sciences.

6. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCi. 427, 442 (2007); see also id. at 439 ("[A]ssuming that the scientific
research continues along its current trajectory, implicit social cognition has the potential to
influence the understanding of intent in all bodies of law.").
7. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal
Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1135-43 (2008).
8. For a thorough discussion of Implicit Association Tests, see infra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text.
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II.

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

Professor Bagenstos does not pinpoint any passages in our article
where we endorsed the normative positions that he ascribes to us. 9
Bypassing a tedious bottom-up textual approach to our article, Bagenstos
adopts a top-down deductive strategy in which he argues that only
scholars committed to a narrow, perpetrator-focused model of illegal
discrimination could find criticisms such as ours relevant to
antidiscrimination
law; hence, we must hold that narrow normative
10

view.
Before showing how Bagenstos misunderstands our criticisms and
the implications of these criticisms for any theory of antidiscrimination
law founded on the science of implicit bias, we pause to note that
Bagenstos not only reads too much into our arguments-he ignores
direct evidence that we do not hold the normative position that he
ascribed to us. We acknowledged that "[a]rguably, under current law,
disparate treatment claims can encompass acts of discrimination caused
by conscious and unconscious influences."11 We did not argue that
rational discrimination should be legal and expressly warned against that
misunderstanding of our arguments: "This next objection is easily
misunderstood: it posits that implicit prejudice, as now conceived, labels

perfectly rational reactions to existing socioeconomic conditions as
prejudiced. It is easy to twist this argument so that it reads 'prejudiceor
discrimination is rational.''1 2 We said that "[i]t is difficult to overstate
the legal significance of [the implicit bias] research if it correctly
diagnoses the pervasiveness and potency of implicit prejudice and

9. He admits as much: "[Mitchell and Tetlock's] arguments fail as a scientific challenge to
implicit bias research because they largely rest on a set of unexpressed normative disagreements
with implicit bias scholars." Bagenstos, supranote 2, at 493 (emphasis added).
10. See id. at 488. Bagenstos attributes to us the view that "Alan Freedman [sic] called the
'perpetrator perspective."' Id. at 488 (quoting Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-54 (1978)).
11. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1038 n.47. Lest we be misread again, we note that
our use of the qualifier "arguably" here was simply a reflection of uncertainty within the law rather
than any normative judgment on our part. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and
the Limits ofAntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) ("There is some question whether
existing antidiscrimination law even prohibits actions driven by unconscious bias.").
12. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1085 (emphasis added). One of us has even
conducted empirical research into the psychology of statistical discrimination and discussed the
very good grounds that may exist for forbidding use of certain base rates, no matter how true they
may be. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs,
ForbiddenBase Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 853,
863-69 (2000).
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related discriminatory tendencies," acknowledging the many ways that3
valid and rigorous implicit bias work might be used to alter the law.'
And we defined bias and prejudice expansively, to include psychological
processes operating at an implicit level, while acknowledging that legal
definitions might be narrower but without endorsing the view that legal
definitions should be narrower.14
For the record-again-we do not defend the view that rational or
unintentional discrimination should be legal or that illegal discrimination
must involve animus. Indeed, we do not reject public health approaches
to discrimination, even of the kind that Bagenstos favors, 15 as they may
have value depending on details of implementation. But we see no value
in basing any model of discrimination-no matter how nobly
intentioned--on flawed social science or basic research with no
demonstrated external validity for real work settings. That was the
overriding message of our earlier article.
We now turn to the specific arguments Bagenstos advances to try to
show that our criticisms of implicit bias research have bite only if one
endorses a narrow definition of illegal discrimination. We show that
Bagenstos makes a number of errors as he tries to reconcile our
criticisms with his preferred interpretations of the implicit bias research
and his normative view on antidiscrimination law.
III.

CAN WE FORMULATE EFFECTIVE REMEDIES WITHOUT
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF IMPLICIT BIAS?

Our original article highlighted a host of ongoing debates about the
validity of the most popular measure of implicit bias: a speeded
stimulus-classification task known as the Implicit Association Test
("IAT"). These debates revolve around what causes some people to be
slower when pairing stimuli from minority groups with positively-

13. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1054.
14. See id. at 1035-38. In advancing his argument that we are committed to an old-fashioned
view of prejudice, Bagenstos also misrepresents, perhaps through misunderstanding, our point about
divergent validity among implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes. Bagenstos asserts that we
assume "that implicit bias reflects explicit prejudicial attitudes," and that we contend the IAT
research lacks construct validity because the correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes are
inconsistent. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 482. Nowhere do we assume that implicit bias must be a
reflection of explicit bias for the former to be valid. Our simple point was that IAT researchers have
taken contradictory positions on whether implicit and explicit attitudes should converge or diverge,
contradictions that demonstrate how preliminary our knowledge in this area is and reveal the lack of
an underlying psychometric theory for implicit bias. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1,at 106065.
15. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 491.
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valenced rather than negatively-valenced stimuli. 16 An "implicit-bias-aspure-prejudice" account treats a positive differential in reaction times
between the minority-negative and minority-positive trials on the IAT as
17
reflecting unalloyed unconscious negativity toward these groups.
Although not even the IAT creators embrace the view that the IAT is
"process-pure" (that is, that it measures only the psychological process
of interest), 8 some legal scholars seem to think that it is. 19 Contrary to
the latter view, the research literature reveals a host of alternative
explanations for, and possible influences on, this reaction-time
differential, including lesser familiarity with minority groups, test
anxiety or evaluation apprehension, guilt about discrimination, sympathy
for disadvantaged groups, cultural knowledge, and a test-taker's
cognitive dexterity in switching between mental tasks. 20 Professor
Bagenstos reads our discussion of these alternative accounts of what
16. The IAT is the most popular implicit measure of bias, and IAT research forms the basis
for most of the new antidiscrimination law scholarship on implicit bias. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green,
A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 849, 854 (2007) ("Perhaps the most well-known recent work on the pervasiveness of
unconscious bias is the Implicit Association Test ('IAT'), developed by social psychologists
Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji."). The IAT is a speeded binary-classification task in
which test-takers are shown stimuli on a computer screen and asked to press a key on the right or
left side of the keyboard to put the stimuli into one of two categories. In the case of the race IAT, for
instance, half the stimuli are photos of either Black or White faces, and the other half of the stimuli
are words that are either positive or negative in character. For half of the trials, the individual
presses one key if the face is White or the word is positive and a different key if the face is Black or
the word is negative. For the other half of the trials, the individual presses one key if the face is
White or the word is negative and a different key if the face is Black or the word is positive. It is
assumed that an individual who is implicitly biased against Blacks will be slower to respond in the
latter task than the former task. The latencies of each response on a given trial are recorded (in
milliseconds) and these latencies are then combined in a complex fashion to yield an overall score
that reflects the implicit attitude. Scores are interpreted such that positive scores indicate an implicit
preference for Whites over Blacks and negative scores indicate an implicit preference for Blacks
over Whites. See generally Kristin Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: IV: What We Know (So Far)About the Method, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59
(Bemd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007) (describing IATs and discussing how biases are
calculated based on the results of such tests).
17. See Lane et al., supranote 16, at 72.
18. Brian Nosek, one of the creators of the IAT, recently stated that "no measure is a processpure assessment of a construct." Brian A. Nosek & Frederick L. Smyth, A Mutlitrait-Multimethod
Validation of the Implicit Association Test: Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Are Related but Distinct
Constructs, 54 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 14, 25 (2007).
19. E.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1510 (2005) ("Tasks
in the schema-consistent arrangement should be easier, and so it is for most of us. How much
easier-as measured by the time differential between the two arrangements-provides a measure of
implicit bias. The obvious confounds-such as overall speed of participant's reactions, right- or lefthandedness, and familiarity with test stimuli-have been examined and shown not to undermine the
IAT's validity.") (citations omitted).
20. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1072-93.
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influences the IAT scores as an argument that the law should not
concern itself with implicit bias if it does not involve the "narrow sort of
prejudice" that he wrongly asserts we believe can be the only proper
source of regulation. 2 1 He then dismisses our whole discussion as
irrelevant: "There is no reason why it should make a difference, from an
antidiscrimination law and policy perspective, whether implicit bias
reflects 'hostility' toward minorities or any of the alternative
22
explanations Mitchell and Tetlock offer.,
Here readers can see precisely where our and Bagenstos's positions
diverge. For Bagenstos, it is self-evident that the IAT directly taps into
implicit bias: after all, people are apparently having a harder time
recognizing and responding to pairings of black-good than to pairings of
white-good--or an easier time responding to pairings of black-bad than
to those of white-bad.23 The IAT must therefore be gauging
discrimination in microcosm-and Bagenstos apparently sees no
problem scaling up to American race relations at large. If around eighty
percent of the American population fails the IAT, that surely means that
around eighty percent of the population must harbor an unconscious
propensity to discriminate against African-Americans. And Bagenstos
seems perplexed why anyone would care about nit-picky psychological
details about whether this unconscious propensity to discriminate is
rooted in animus as opposed to figure-ground asymmetries or cognitive
dexterity or realistic assessments of covariation between group
membership and bad outcomes. If people are being victimized by
prejudice, whether it takes the form of conscious or unconscious bias,
why do Mitchell and Tetlock want to take us on a detour into a
potentially endless debate over the precise mechanisms causing the
victimization?
By contrast, our view is that the validity of psychological tests must
be demonstrated, not simply stipulated. We are certain that the IAT does
not tap into "100% pure prejudice," whether implicit or explicit, and we
remain unconvinced about the policy implications of the IAT work for
two mutually reinforcing reasons: (1) an extensive body of
psychological evidence that shows that IAT scores are influenced by a

21. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 483.
22. Id.at 485.
23. For instance, Bagenstos states that "[i]f whites act in a bigoted way on the IAT because
they are afraid of being stereotyped as bigots... whites who make employment decisions could just
as well act in a bigoted way in those decisions because they are afraid of being stereotyped as
bigots." Id.(emphasis added). Thus, for Bagenstos, the IAT reaction times themselves reveal a
bigotry regardless of the source of the "bigotry."
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wide range of processes that cannot plausibly be labeled precursors to
discrimination, and (2) the lack of psychological evidence that IAT
scores map in strong and replicable functional forms onto propensities to
discriminate in the real world. Put as simply as we know how, the fact
that eighty percent of Americans "fail" the IAT does not mean that
eighty percent of Americans are unconsciously biased. From our
standpoint, it is inappropriate to claim an empirical mandate for
restructuring antidiscrimination law on the basis of a still-developing
line of scientific inquiry with no record of applied success.
This discussion brings us to the centerpiece irony of our exchange
with Bagenstos. The normative conclusions that Bagenstos draws about
our supposed implicit value agenda seem to be driven, at least in part, by
scientific misconceptions that Bagenstos holds about implicit bias
research. Bagenstos's pivotal misconception is that the much-publicized
IAT failure rate (often placed around eighty percent) must be telling us
something profoundly important about the true level of unconscious
prejudice in America today. But the IAT failure rate tells us little or
nothing of importance about unconscious prejudice if it turns out that
IAT scores have little or no power to predict real-world discrimination,
no matter how expansively defined.24
Moreover, even if the IAT had been shown reliably to predict
discrimination, it is still important to understand the underlying
mechanisms of implicit bias. Policy that seeks to change unwanted
outcomes without an understanding of the causes of these unwanted
outcomes is likely to be ineffective and may even make matters worse.
To invoke a few simple examples from our earlier article, if implicit bias
flows from lack of familiarity with minority groups, then policies that
promote intergroup contact might be most effective, whereas bias
flowing from cultural knowledge might be more effectively attacked by
media policies of the sort Kang advances (and we would still need to
know a great deal about causal mechanisms to formulate an effective
media policy). 26 It seems to us that the implicit bias case for affirmative
24. We emphasized this point in our original article. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at
1033, 1100, 1102, 1107-15. For further discussion of this point, see Amy L. Wax, The
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 984-85 (2008).
25. Some evidence suggests that this has been the case with the Americans with Disabilities
Act, for instance. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced
Employment for People With Disabilities?, 25 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 562 (2004) ("[T]o
achieve their goals disability rights advocates must honestly confront the ADA's record in all of its
complexities. The record has been a mixed one, and the disability rights movement will do itself no
favors if it ignores the negative, as well as the positive, aspects of that record.").
26. Kang, supra note 19, at 1549-53.
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action measures of the sort Kang and Banaji propose weakens to the

extent that test anxiety or differences in cognitive dexterity contribute
significantly to IAT scores. 27 And should we introduce measures that

raise consciousness about possible implicit biases, as Kang and Banaji
suggest we should by having employees take the IAT,28 if these

measures will create greater anxiety and guilt about race relations and
lead to the very kind of stilted, uncomfortable interracial interactions

that implicit bias scholars contend disadvantage minorities in the
workplace? 29 Are these measures even necessary if small amounts of
individuating information moderate both implicit and explicit bias? 30 In
our view, a better understanding of the causes of implicit bias should
precede the formation of public policy if the goal is to formulate
effective policy.
Our concern was, and is, that so many legal scholars have
accepted-seemingly at face value-claims of implicit bias researchers
that they have discovered powerful psychological precursors of

discrimination operating at an unconscious level. 3 Bagenstos, for
instance, treats the terms "implicit bias" and "unconscious bias" as
synonyms.32 If one assumes that implicit bias operates beyond conscious

control and that the unconscious cannot be motivated by pro-diversity
values or situational goals, then it is easy to conclude that
antidiscrimination law places too much emphasis on the regulation of

27. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1098-101 (2006).
28. Id. at 1090-92.
at 1095 ("Although awkwardness might seem trivial, prior research confirms
29. See, e.g., id.
that awkwardness leads to worse interviews."). Professor Norton and colleagues empirically
demonstrated that one's efforts to appear unprejudiced in interracial interactions may have perverse
effects: "Ironically, those Whites who tried hardest to appear color-blind by avoiding the use of race
[in a task where race was relevant to a discussion] were the individuals who appeared least friendly
when interacting with Black partners." Michael I. Norton et al., Color Blindness and Interracial
Interaction:Playing the Political CorrectnessGame, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 949, 952 (2006).
30. See Thomas R. Cain & Lee Jussim, Individuating Information Reduces Implicit and
Explicit Stereotyping 15 (Oct. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Law
Review) ("The main message of this study is that individuating information reduces implicit
stereotyping of individuals as much as it reduces explicit stereotyping of individuals.").
31. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations,94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (describing "implicit bias" as "an aspect of the new
science of unconscious mental processes that has substantial bearing on discrimination law"); id. at
951 ("The very existence of implicit bias poses a challenge to legal theory and practice, because
discrimination doctrine is premised on the assumption that, barring insanity or mental
incompetence, human actors are guided by their avowed (explicit) beliefs, attitudes, and
intentions.").
32. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 477 ("In recent years, scholars of antidiscrimination law
have increasingly focused on the problem of 'implicit' or 'unconscious' bias.").
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conscious thought and intentional conduct.33 But is it correct to assume
that implicit biases operate beyond control or beyond the influence of
conscious knowledge and that the unconscious is not goal driven?
Empirical research suggests not. Conrey and her colleagues found
that the IAT measures both controlled psychological processes (which
do not meet the criteria in psychology for being classified as
unconscious processes) and automatic psychological processes (which
typically do meet those criteria).34 And Professor De Houwer found that
conscious propositional knowledge can influence IAT responses, leading
him to conclude that "one cannot simply assume that implicit, reactiontime based measures are impervious to the effects of conscious
propositional knowledge. 35 Other research has found that subjects can
fake both established and novel attitudes on the IAT when instructed to
do so or when placed into situations where faking an attitude would be
beneficial.3 6 And there is now considerable evidence that even
unconscious processes are goal driven, with egalitarian goals moderating
implicit biases.37 In short, the research picture that is emerging is much
33. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969,
980 (2006) ("The central focus of existing antidiscrimination law is on prohibiting consciously
biased decisionmaking-a focus that has produced intense criticism from those interested in implicit
bias.").
34. Frederica R. Conrey et al., Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition:
The Quad Model of Implicit Task Performance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483
(2005) ("[O]ur findings suggest that researchers should exercise caution in assuming that the
implicit prejudice scores they calculate with priming measures or with the IAT reflect exclusively
the strength of automatic associations. Clearly, attempts to overcome these associations also
contribute to performance on these tasks.").
35. Jan De Houwer, Using the Implicit Association Test Does Not Rule Out an Impact of
Conscious PropositionalKnowledge on Evaluative Conditioning, 37 LEARNING & MOTIVATION
176, 186 (2006).
36. See Sandor Czellar, Self-Presentational Effects in the Implicit Association Test, 16 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 92, 99 (2006) ("Although these results indicate that the IAT is susceptible to
.self-presentation and that it is possible to fake the IAT, additional research is needed to understand
how exactly these effects arise."); Jan De Houwer et al., Novel Attitudes Can Be Faked on the
Implicit Association Test, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 972, 976 (2007) ("Our results
suggest that participants can fake having newly formed attitudes as measured by the ]AT."); Klaus
Fiedler & Matthias Bluemke, Fakingthe IA T: Aided and UnaidedResponse Control on the Implicit
Association Tests, 27 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 307, 314 (2005) ("The three experiments
reported here provide a clear-cut answer to the question of whether controlled responding or faking
on the IAT is possible. The answer is an unqualified Yes."). Professors Fiedler and Bluemke tested
whether experts could reliably detect faked IAT scores so that these scores could be removed from
datasets and found that the experts could not reliably identify the faked scores. Fiedler & Bluemke,
supra, at 315 ("For two experienced experts, it was virtually impossible to identify IAT fakers
among [twenty-four] respondents above chance. Thus, fakers not only managed to produce desired
test outcomes but also to conceal their controlled responding effectively.").
37. See, e.g., Luigi Castelli & Silvia Tomelleri, Contextual Effects on PrejudicedAttitudes:
When the Presence of Others Leads to More EgalitarianResponses, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
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more complex than that painted by proponents of a strong implicit bias
view who dismiss regulation aimed at the intentional level. 38 At most,

implicit bias research reveals that some automatic psychological
processes can contribute to variation in scores on implicit measures of
bias, but the degree to which automatic versus controlled processes
contribute to these scores and the degree to which individuals can exert
control over implicit bias (consciously or unconsciously) remain unclear.
Furthermore, not all automatic psychological processes call for the
same regulatory response:
Some automatic associations or impulses will drive behavior because
they are very strong. In other cases, the automatic components will
drive behavior because the ability to control them is weak. The
implications of the two situations are very different. For example, the
causes, consequences, and cures for implicit prejudice stemming from
PSYCHOL. 679, 683-84 (2008) ("The actual presence of other individuals significantly modified
spontaneous responses demonstrating that changes in the surrounding social environment were
effective in producing a positive shift in automatic intergroup attitudes.... In the presence of other
persons, egalitarian-related concepts were more easily accessed after the presentation of Black faces
demonstrating that the group context triggered the goal of not being prejudiced and behaving fairly
toward Blacks.") (citation omitted); Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and
Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice,82 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) ("[W]e expected that participants who reported high levels of
internal motivation and low levels of external motivation and, thus, were theoretically highly
autonomous would be the most effective at regulating expressions of race bias, even on difficult-tocontrol responses. Consistent with our expectations, these individuals responded with lower levels
of implicit race bias than did all other participants."); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., The Implicit
Volition Model: On the Preconscious Regulation of Temporarily Adopted Goals, 36 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 317, 396 (2004) ("People who had fairness goals triggered by
contemplating such a prior experience (thinking about failures at being egalitarian) did not show
activation of the stereotype. They compensated for the triggered goal by engaging in goalcompatible responses such as inhibiting the stereotype."); Kai Sassenberg & Gordon B. Moskowitz,
Don't Stereotype, Think Different! Overcoming Automatic Stereotype Activation by Mindset
Priming, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 511-12 (2005) (describing research where
situational cues to think creatively activated a "think different" mindset in which stereotypic
associations were inhibited, not activated, or not retrieved); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of
Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 583, 590 (2005) ("The reported experiments provide clear support for the notion that
automatic racial attitudes are subject to affiliative social tuning. Across two experiments, two
measures of automatic prejudice, and three operationalizations of affiliative motivation, automatic
prejudice shifted toward the ostensible attitudes of a social actor to the degree that individuals were
motivated to get along with him or her.... This research adds to the growing literature
demonstrating that automatic attitudes flexibly respond to social motives."). See generally Gregory
Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with the
Hofstra Law Review) (arguing that second thoughts can act as important checks on judgments,
decisions, and behaviors, with regard to interpersonal biases).
38. See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 27, at 1079 ("[A]n explicit ex ante exhortation not to
be intentionally unfair will do little to counter implicit cognitive processes, which take place outside
our awareness yet influence our behavior.").
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strong automatic biases and weak self-regulatory processes are going
to be very different. In some contexts, it may be that training someone
to overcome their biases is far more simple than eliminating those
biases. Indeed, among the recent spate of research showing the
apparent ease of changing implicit attitudes, we suspect that, in many
cases, it has been a matter of39training people to overcome their biases
rather than eliminating them.

Simply labeling a process automatic or unconscious does not
dictate how the law should respond.
There is yet another reason to care about the specific processes that
contribute to scores on implicit measures of bias: because even the
simplest psychological tests will implicate a number of psychological
processes that may differ in form and function across individuals, every
test presents the potential for contamination by measurement artifacts.
Although Bagenstos works hard to explain all influences on IAT scores
as consistent with an implicit bias perspective,40 the creators of the IAT
39. Jeffrey W. Sherman, On Building a Better Process Model: It's Not Only How Many, but
Which Ones and by Which Means?, 17 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 173, 177 (2006) (citations omitted).
40. As one example of Bagenstos's efforts to assimilate all evidence to the view that IAT
scores signify socially-harmful implicit biases, consider his response to evidence that figure-ground
asymmetries (or the differential familiarity of IAT stimuli) inflate IAT scores by systematically
slowing and speeding reaction times. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1,at 1072-79. Bagenstos
writes that:
Racial unfamiliarity ('figure-ground asymmetry' in Mitchell and Tetlock's technical
term) exists in the employment setting as well as in the laboratory setting. To the extent
that unfamiliarity with members of minority groups in certain work settings leads their
white counterparts to engage (even unconsciously) in aversive behavior, that aversion
will have the same negative effects on minorities' opportunities as will aversion
motivated by hostility.
Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 485. Here Bagenstos either misreads the IAT research or makes the kind
of erroneous inferential leap that we feared would happen with legal scholars' uses of the IAT work:
evidence that figure-ground asymmetries inflate scores on the IAT by affecting millisecond reaction
times on this computer-based test provide no evidence whatsoever that figure-ground asymmetries
in the workplace lead to aversive behavior of any kind toward minorities. A score showing "bias"
on the IAT is not empirical proof that this test-taker will respond to figure-ground asymmetries in a
work environment the way he or she responded to stimulus asymmetries detected in milliseconds on
a speeded, computer-based test, much less that he or she will engage in discriminatory behaviors in
interpersonal relations. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1,at 1065-79, 1100-05. Bagenstos
provides no logical, theoretical, or empirical basis for equating figure-ground asymmetry effects on
the IAT with figure-ground asymmetry effects on any kind of behavior in a work setting.
Moreover, we addressed evidence on the question of whether IAT scores predict
discrimination of any kind in interracial interactions and noted the weak and mixed results of the
few studies that have sought to study this question, including mentioning one study that found that
persons scoring as more biased on the IAT were rated as having better interactions with minorities
than persons showing less bias on the IAT. See id.at 1065-72, 1100-05. In response to our mention
of this particular study, Bagenstos writes that the study presents no problems for implicit bias
research, because "[a] key point of implicit bias, to proponents of the theory, is that it is invisible.
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do not agree that all influences on IAT scores reflect intergroup bias. In
2003, five years after the IAT had been introduced and a tremendous
amount of IAT data had been gathered, Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek
acknowledged that performance on the IAT is contaminated by what
might be called general processing speed (in simple terms, how fast one
can perform mental tasks such as reacting to stimuli flashed on a
computer screen for purposes of categorizing these stimuli), such that
persons with slower processing speed (for example, many older persons
and persons with less working memory) will have higher "bias" scores
on the JAT regardless of whether these persons associate the categories
of minorities and women with more negative (or less positive) concepts
than the category of White males. In other words, the pre-2003 version
of the IAT artificially inflated the bias scores of some groups of persons
simply because of how the test was administered and scored. Due to this
measurement artifact, Greenwald and colleagues rejected the original
method for scoring the IAT in favor of a new method that is supposed to

That minorities-many of whom may themselves share those biases-cannot detect implicit biases
in others is not in any way a refutation of the theory." Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 483 (citations
omitted). Again, Bagenstos misreads the implicit bias work or misapplies it as he tries to defend the
implicit bias view: While implicit bias researchers have claimed that the psychological construct of
"implicit bias" might be "invisible" to the actor and perhaps the target as well at times, they have
not claimed that the behavioral consequences of implicit bias cannot be detected. (Indeed, if they
had so argued, then it would be impossible to claim a scientific basis for the claim that implicit bias
leads to discrimination because the hypothesis would be untestable.) In fact, to support the view that
the IAT predicts discrimination, proponents of the strong implicit bias view often cite a study by
Professors McConnell and Leibold, in which both observers and persons interacting with
experimental subjects supposedly rated those subjects with higher IAT scores as more biased in
their interracial interactions. Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit
Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2001). Thus, implicit bias researchers are quite willing to
take a position contrary to the invisibility position advanced by Bagenstos when the data turn out
differently than in the earlier study we mentioned. (Incidentally, our reanalysis of the McConnell
and Leibold dataset reached very different conclusions from those reported by McConnell and
Leibold, with our reanalysis finding that higher IAT scores were actually correlated with more
positive interracial interactions as judged by observers.) Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and
Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 18, on file with the Hofstra Law Review). So we are left
scratching our heads: Does Bagenstos believe that "bias" detected by the IAT will lead to "aversive
behavior" toward minorities, or does he believe that "bias" detected by the IAT will always remain
invisible except on the IAT, so invisible that even persons showing a strong bias on the IAT will
treat minorities better than--or no worse than-persons showing no bias on the IAT? If he takes the
first position that implicit bias harms minorities but claims that it does so in ways that cannot be
detected by the interacting parties, researchers, or courts, then his claim cannot be falsified. If he
takes the second position, then there are no adverse behavioral effects of the bias detected on the
IAT that could support a new regulatory regime.
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remove this artifact. 4 1 Had researchers not scrutinized the sources of IAT
scores, then persons with relatively slower processing speeds would
continue to be labeled more biased than is justified due to this
measurement artifact.42
Our point is not that legal scholars should do empirical research on
measurement artifacts in the IAT. Rather, legal scholars need to be
informed that data based on pre-2003 versions of the IAT
unquestionably contain artificially inflated estimates of bias for some
portion of the subject population and that other artifacts may exist given
the very young age of the IAT and its undeveloped psychometric
foundation.4 3 Otherwise, bad advice may be given. For instance, before
41. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I.
An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 212 (2003) ("The
present findings call strongly for replacing the IAT's conventional scoring procedure."); id at 214
("[T]he improved algorithm offers a gain in construct purity. That is, the improved algorithm,
compared with the conventional scoring procedure, is less contaminated by extraneous variables.
One such contaminant is the conventional TAT measure's production of spuriously extreme IAT
scores for slow responders .... The new algorithm almost completely eliminates this
artifact .... ); id. at 214-15 ("Resistance to the response-speed artifact should be useful in studies
that compare TAT scores for groups, such as children versus adults, that differ in speed of
responding. The new algorithm likewise should provide more valid correlations of IAT measures
with individual difference measures, such as age or working memory capacity, that correlate with
response speed."). Whether the new method for scoring the TAT appropriately controls for
processing speed artifacts remains a point of debate. See, e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Decoding the
Implicit Association Test: Implications for Criterion Prediction, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 192, 209-10 (2006) (discussing problems with alternative approaches to scoring the TAT).
42. Greenwald and colleagues acknowledge one other measurement artifact: prior experience
taking the IAT tends to lead to lower TAT scores. The new algorithm "affords some protection"
against this artifact but does not completely eliminate it. Greenwald et al., supra note 41, at 215.
Thus, if one wants to become "less implicitly biased" (if IAT scores translate directly into implicit
bias, as Bagenstos suggests), then one simply needs to practice taking the IAT.
43. Professor Borsboom describes the psychometrics underlying the IAT:
First, the original paper [publishing the IAT procedure] puts forward no psychometric
model for the dynamics underlying the test whatsoever. Second, even though the test is
described as a measure of individual differences, the main evidence for its validity is a
set of mean differences over experimental conditions, and no formal model explicating
the link between these two domains is offered. Third,. . .the TAT is a popular
measurement procedure despite these points. Fourth, it took no less than eight years for a
detailed psychometric modeling analysis of the proposed measure to see the light; and
that analysis suggests that the scoring procedures used are actually quite problematic,
because the various possible psychometric models on which they could be predicated are
not supported by the data.
Denny Borsboom, The Attack of the Psychometricians, 71 PSYCHOMETRIKA 425, 430 (2006)
(citation omitted). And Borsboom does not even mention the low test-retest reliability coefficient
of.56 associated with the IAT, which means that one's IAT score may vary widely over repeated
testing sessions. See Brian A. Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A
Methodological and Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE
AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 265, 274 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007). We suspect

that Bagenstos and other implicit bias proponents would roundly reject the use of an aptitude test
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the article on the IAT's processing-speed artifact had been published,
Professor Ayres suggested that IAT scores could be used "as a criterion
for hiring both governmental and nongovernmental actors."" Because of
the processing-speed artifact, however, an employer that followed
Ayres' suggestion would probably have excluded from hiring a number
of persons over the age of forty or fifty or anyone with lower working
memory capacity (which tends to be correlated with lower IQ and not
just age), regardless of those persons' "true" levels of implicit bias.45
IV.

SHOULD WE DEFER TO IMPLICIT BIAS RESEARCHERS'

UNSCIENTIFIC JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE MEANING OF OBSERVED
BEHAVIORS?

Professor Bagenstos's greatest irritation with our article seems to
stem from our discussion of whether the IAT simply measures people's
observations of objective conditions in the world.46 Contrary to
Bagenstos's suggestion,47 we did not argue that discrimination flowing
from rational observations of existing conditions in society should be
legally immune, and we do not hold that view. Rather, we mentioned the
possibility that the IAT measures tacit awareness of existing inequalities
to illustrate the value-laden terms chosen by psychologists to describe
data that are open to less loaded interpretations and to warn against
with such a low reliability coefficient as part of an application or promotion process. Cf REBECCA
M. WARNER, APPLIED STATISTICS: FROM BIVARIATE THROUGH MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 83132 (2008) ("[W]hen scores for an individual are used to make decisions that have important
consequences (such as medical diagnosis or placement in a special class for children with low
academic ability), a reliability of r =.90 is the bare minimum and r =.95 would be a desirable
standard for reliability (because even very small measurement errors could result in mistakes that
could be quite harmful to the individuals concerned).").
44. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION 424 (2001). Bagenstos expresses reservations about this suggestion. See
Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 479, 48 1.
45. Bagenstos describes our raising the prospect of such false-positive accusations as showing
"intense concern" for those who may be falsely labeled implicit racists or implicit sexists.
Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 489. We fail to see how pointing out this fact shows "intense" concern
for those falsely accused of implicit bias, much less how it reveals where we stand on the balancing
of Type I errors (false negatives) and Type 11 errors (false positives). And we expressly stated that
deciding whether any particular level of false accusations is excessive is a matter of political values
rather than scientific fact. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1101. Absent some argument
that Bagenstos does not make-perhaps Bagenstos feels that we must endure some number of false
positives to prevent some number of true positives from being in the workplace-we see no value in
excluding unbiased persons from the workplace through an erroneous test result. But again, that was
not our point-we were just reporting this fact because itwould seem to be a potentially relevant,
but neglected, point for policy-making purposes.
46. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 486-88.
47. Id. at 488.
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placing too much weight on the tendentious labels chosen to characterize
these data.
In our opinion, we have collectively entered the theater of the
absurd if social psychologists can create a test that may measure whether
people recognize inequalities in society and, when the test reveals that
people do recognize indisputable inequalities, declare these test-takers to
be implicitly biased against the have-nots in this society-with no
evidence that particularscores on this test predict any kind of behavior
by particulartest-takers toward the have-nots, whether that behavior be

subtle or unsubtle, in the workplace, social life, or the voting booth.
Rather than question whether this conclusion follows, legal scholars and
psychologists embrace this conclusion and argue in law reviews and
courts that the results of this test prove that we have an epidemic of
unconscious bias in our society.48 To make the point crystal clear that we
are attacking the logic of reading the IAT as a direct pipeline to implicit
bias with behavioral implications, and are not arguing that actual
discrimination flowing from rational beliefs should be legal, imagine
that the IAT is not a speeded stimulus-classification test taken on the
computer, but rather a paper-and-pencil test that asks the test-taker
whether, in America today, African-Americans as a group fare better or
worse than European-Americans as a group. If the test-taker answers
that African-Americans fare worse, then we score the test-taker as
implicitly biased. If the test-taker asks on what basis we reach that
conclusion, then we reply that: (a) our test is an implicit measure of bias
because its purpose-to assess racial bias-was surely not obvious and
48. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Ass'n in Support of
Respondents at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516) ("The results
of the research on associative processes conclusively demonstrate that unconscious stereotyping and
prejudice, including race stereotyping, is widespread. To take but one example, test respondents
consistently make more ready associations between, on the one hand, faces of African Americans
and words having negative concepts (e.g., bomb, devil, awful) and, on the other, faces of Whites
and positive concepts (e.g. [,] peace, joy, love). Hundreds of thousands of individuals have taken the
test producing similar results.") (citation omitted); Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 5 ("Social
psychologists have demonstrated that implicit biases against women and racial minorities remain
widespread."); Kang & Banaji, supra note 27, at 1072 ("[B]y a conservative estimate, around ninety
percent of Americans (and others in the western world), mentally associate negative concepts with
the social group 'elderly'; only about ten percent show the opposite effect associating elderly with
positive concepts. Seventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of Blacks) show anti-Black
bias, and seventy-five percent of men and women do not associate female with career as easily as
they associate female to family."); see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 3 1, at 955 ("Since
1998, [AT measures of implicit attitudes have been available on the Internet for self-administered
demonstration use. These web-accessible demonstrations, which allow users to interactively
experience the IAT, have accumulated sufficient data to allow researchers to draw conclusions
about the pervasiveness of implicit and explicit biases.") (citation omitted).
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hence the test-taker had no motive to fake the answer;4 9 and (b) the testtaker's response reflects positive and negative mental associations with
the categories "African-American" and "European-American." 50 If the
label "implicitly biased" seems absurd to apply here, then one
appreciates our point that the inventors of the IAT-who, from its
inception, labeled the IAT a measure of "implicit prejudice" despite any
evidence that it predicted any kind of discriminatory behavior5 -have
embraced an expansive view of implicit prejudice.
One may say that the inventors are entitled to claim whatever they
wish about what their test measures. But the scientific community is
entitled to scrutinize these claims-and the legal and policy
communities are entitled to be skeptical when labels linked to test results
are being bandied about in debates over how racist American society is,
or the tests are being used to give the general public feedback about its
supposed unconscious biases and the strength of these biases. Our fear is
that the public and legal scholars are deferring to social scientists in their
choice of terms because they believe these terms to possess an epistemic
authority that they do not. Recall that the output of the IAT is relative
reaction times in classifying minority and majority stimuli paired with
words putatively having positive or negative connotations. If you take
the race IAT on the web and have slower reaction times when pairing
minority stimuli with positive things, for example, you will not be told
your reaction times but instead will be told that you have a "slight
automatic preference," a "moderate automatic preference," or a "strong
49. Our imaginary version of the IAT thus continues to meet the IAT creators' definition of
an "implicit" measure: "The IAT is an implicit measure because it infers group-valence and grouptrait associations from performances that are influenced by those associations in a manner that is not
discerned by respondents." Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 31, at 952. That a few respondents
might guess our purpose will not require us to divest our instrument of the "implicit measure" label
under the IAT creators' standards. See id. at 952 n.23.
50. Cf Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 435 ("The culture and the person are intricately
intertwined, and it would be a mistake to assume that signals of ingroup-favoring attitudes, because
their content may have its origins in culturally shared knowledge, are hence not a part of the
individual.").
51. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., MeasuringIndividualDifferences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1475 (1998) (describing
their findings as "discouraging in indicating the pervasiveness of unconscious forms of prejudice").
The preceding paper was the first publication of the 1AT method and IAT data. See also Mahzarin
R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN

HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 138-39 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001) ("[T]he IAT
roughly detects repeated cultural pairing (moderated through individual experience) of Black + bad
and White + good, most clearly among non-Black inhabitants of the United States .... Implicit
attitudes, as I see it, reflect traces of experiences within a culture that have become so integral a part
of the individual's own mental and social makeup that it is artificial, if not patently odd, to separate
such attitudes into 'culture' versus 'self parts.").
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automatic preference" for European-Americans relative to AfricanAmericans, depending on how much faster you acted when pairing
majority stimuli with positive things relative to minority stimuli with
positive things. 52 Perhaps the term "response bias" would be empirically
justified by these data (assuming any reaction-time differential was not a
measurement artifact), but to call millisecond reaction-time data on a
stimulus-classification test evidence of an "automatic preference"
implies that whatever caused the reaction-time differential will also
cause one automatically to prefer Whites over Blacks in other contexts,
even though the IAT does not measure preferential judgments or choices
at a conscious or unconscious level (unless one embraces the extreme
reductionist view that mental associations of group categories with
valence terms are preferences). In light of the many alternative accounts
of what the IAT might measure, there is no scientific justification for
choosing the "automatic preference" account until the alternatives are
eliminated, and there is no scientific justification for implying that
"automatic preferences" as measured by the IAT generalize until ranges
of IAT scores are empirically connected to preferences in other contexts.
The personal and social implications of an unconscious "preference" for
Whites over Blacks may be very troubling, but there is presently
no
53
scientific basis for reading IAT scores to signify such preferences.
Furthermore, the conversion of continuous reaction-time data from
the IAT into qualitative categories, with these qualitative categories then
being used to characterize the pervasiveness and strength of implicit
biases within the United States population, 4 lacks scientific justification.
The conversion of quantitative reaction-time scores into value-laden
52. One may take the race IAT at Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/
selectatest.html (last visited July 21, 2009).
53. And as we discuss in Part V, there is little evidence that the IAT correlates with
discriminatory behavior (or group preferences) in the aggregate and no evidence that the IAT can
make reliable distinctions between the behavior of individuals who score differently on the IAT. In
any event, implicit bias researchers have needed nothing more than IAT scores to pronounce the
great majority of Americans implicitly biased because an IAT score alone is treated as an
unproblematic measure of relative group preferences.
54. See, e.g., Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 31, at 955-56 (summarizing a large dataset of
IAT scores collected via the web and characterizing this dataset as showing pervasive implicit
biases in favor of advantaged groups and characterizing these biases in terms of strength); Robert G.
Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (and What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 500-01 (2007) ("The Race IAT has been administered to tens of thousands
of people in the United States, over eighty percent of whom exhibit an implicit pro-white bias.
These results show that our unconscious racial attitudes 'may be utterly incompatible with our
stated conscious values.' For example, even people who profess strongly egalitarian views often
exhibit pro-white implicit biases." (citations omitted) (quoting MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE
POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 85 (2005))).
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qualitative categories is not grounded in any theory about the functions
relating IAT scores to the underlying latent construct of implicit bias, be
it a linear or geometric function of some sort. Nor is it grounded in any
empirical data about the behavioral implications of different ranges of
IAT scores (for example, data showing that IAT scores in a certain range
correlate consistently with opposition to affirmative action or negative
reactions to Blacks or that people populating the same ranges of IAT
scores show equivalent levels of bias on other measures of implicit bias).
The conversion to qualitative categories reflects nothing more than the
IAT architects' adaptation of a rule of thumb used by social scientists to
compare effect sizes across studies. 55
The originator of this rule of thumb, Jacob Cohen, did not propose
that the convention be used to define the extremity of a score in a
distribution and certainly not to convert continuous scores into
qualitative categories for purposes of giving descriptive feedback to testtakers or population-level diagnostics. Cohen intended his rule of thumb
simply as a shorthand way for researchers to compare the size of group
means across studies, and he made clear that his rule of thumb was not
based on empirical data about the social or practical meaning of different
effect sizes:
[T]hese proposed conventions were set forth throughout with much
diffidence, qualifications, and invitations not to employ them if
possible. The values chosen had no more reliable a basis than my own
intuition. They were offered as conventions because they were needed
in a research climate characterized by a neglect of attention to issues of
magnitude. The [effect size] measures and conventions have been
successful, widely adopted not only for power analysis, but more
widely, for example, in [effect size] surveys and in meta-analysis.
But
56
there are difficulties and much room for misunderstanding.
The mischief that may come from endowing the classification
scheme chosen by the IAT researchers with social meaning can be
illustrated by examining the distribution of implicit bias as it existed in
2002, before the IAT architects acknowledged that a processing-speed
artifact inflated bias scores, and the distribution in 2007, after changes
were made to try to remove that artifact. In 2002, forty-eight percent of
the people who took the race IAT were classified as showing a strong
55. See Greenwald et al., supra note 41, at 199 n.3 ("The slight medium, and strong labels
corresponded to results meeting the conventional criteria for small, medium, and large effect sizes
of Cohen's (1977) d measure.").

56.

JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

532 (2d

ed. 1988).
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automatic preference for Whites over Blacks. 57 In 2007, twenty-seven
percent of the people who took the IAT were classified as showing a
strong automatic preference for Whites over Blacks. 58 No transformative
legal or social event occurred within this five-year time period to reduce
implicit bias by twenty-one percent; the IAT architects simply changed
the way they defined bias on the test and, in connection with this change,
employed a new variant of Cohen's effect-size rule of thumb (in other
words, no research linking implicit attitudes to behavior drove the
result-an analogy to Cohen's effect size convention and nothing more
is wholly responsible for the categorical definitions). 59 The result was a
dramatic change in the distribution of implicit bias in the United States,
at least within the IAT creators' classification scheme (the table below
provides a full breakdown of how percentages in the various qualitative
categories changed from 2002 to 2007).60
Category
Strong Automatic Preference for Whites Over Blacks
Moderate Automatic Preference for Whites Over Blacks
Slight Automatic Preference for Whites Over Blacks
No Preference
Slight Automatic Preference for Blacks Over Whites
Moderate Automatic Preference for Blacks Over Whites
Strong Automatic Preference for Blacks Over Whites

2002

2007

48%
13%
12%
12%
6%
4%
6%

27%
27%
16%
17%
6%
4%
2%

Table 1: Distribution of Race IAT Scores by Categories 6 1
Imagine that, five years from now, the inventors of the IAT again
decide to change their criteria for converting reaction times into
57. Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuitof a Measure,
34 ANN. REV. Soc. 277, 291 tbl.1 (2008).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 291.
60. Mischief may occur at the individual level as well. First, because continuous scores are
converted into categories using hard cut scores, one may be told one has a moderate automatic
preference for Whites over Blacks when one's reaction times are much more similar to the average
reaction time for those in the slight automatic preference category than the moderate category.
Second, placing people into slight, moderate, and strong automatic preference categories based on
relative position within a distribution can produce very misleading feedback. Thus, a person whose
objective reaction times exhibit less of a differential than another person's may be categorized as
more biased if the distribution containing the first person is tighter (in terms of the standard
deviation) than the distribution containing the second person (assuming the same distribution
means).
61. Adapted from Blanton & Jaccard, supra note 57, at 291 tbl.l.
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qualitative categories, such that implicit bias surges back to pre-2007
levels or even higher if they should choose to make it go higher through
definitional fiat. Should courts and legislatures defer to these social
psychologists' judgments about what constitutes slight, moderate, and
strong bias? Should courts and legislatures, as well as legal scholars
relying on implicit bias work, look for empirical data to justify the
conversions, or at least some theory about how IAT scores relate to the
62
underlying psychological construct that is supposedly being measured?
The upshot of many of Bagenstos's arguments is that we should
defer to the implicit bias researchers' interpretations of the IAT data and
to their definitional decisions, regardless of the scientific foundation for
those interpretations and decisions.6 3 Anyone who dissents must do so
because he or she rejects a progressive antidiscrimination law agenda.
Of course, that conclusion does not follow. A strategy in which one
stops investigating the facts once the facts support preferred value
positions is not a wise strategy for scientific research, litigation, or
policymaking. If the validity of prescriptive arguments based on implicit
bias research depends on acceptance of the loaded data labels arbitrarily
chosen by implicit bias researchers, then perverse effects are likely to
follow from policy based on these prescriptive arguments, and these
arguments are unlikely to persuade persons not already convinced of the
need for new approaches to discrimination and societal inequality.

62. Lest we be misunderstood again, we do not contend that the IAT could never meet some
scientific test for validation as a psychometrically reliable measure of an individual's group bias or
automatic preferences. It just has not done so yet.
63. As yet another example, Bagenstos endorses the implicit bias researchers' view that
implicit bias is a unique psychological construct distinct in some way from explicit bias: "Scholars
who advocate using the law [to respond to implicit bias] have strongly urged that implicit biases are
meaningfully distinct from explicit attitudes." Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 482. Bagenstos is correct
that legal advocates of the strong implicit bias view urge that implicit and explicit bias are distinct,
but, from an evidentiary standpoint, the research does not point to such a simple conclusion. As we
discussed previously, different implicit measures of bias do not converge as one might expect if
they are tapping into the same latent constructs, and implicit and explicit measures of bias converge
and diverge rather unpredictably and certainly to a greater extent than a strong "implicit bias is
distinct from explicit bias" view can support. See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 1, at 1059-65. Our
point in noting these open questions was not to argue that implicit and explicit bias must be one and
the same or the law should look the other way. Our point is that there is not yet a sound scientific
case for the "dissociation" view that Bagenstos endorses and which is so central to the argument
that implicit bias calls for radical new forms of legal regulation. See supra note 14 (discussing how
IAT researchers have taken contradictory positions on the convergence and divergence of implicit
and explicit attitudes).
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WHAT ROLE DOES SCIENCE REALLY PLAY IN BAGENSTOS'S
ARGUMENT?

Professor Bagenstos ends his critique of our article with admirable
candor about his own normative agenda and reasons for disputing the
claims in our article. This candor reveals that, ultimately, Bagenstos's
primary concern is that our scientific concerns will be mistaken as a
refutation of the normative agenda that has come to be associated with
the implicit bias research.
In closing his article, Bagenstos concedes that some of our
challenges "call for caution and further study before taking the more
extreme steps urged by some scholars who write about implicit bias,"
but he insists that our challenges "do not undermine the strong reasons to
believe that implicit bias contributes to a serious social problem that
denies opportunities to blacks and other minorities in America." 64 What
are these "strong reasons" to believe implicit bias causes social harms?
We cannot say for sure, because Bagenstos does not directly state
those reasons, but one possibility suggested elsewhere in his paper is that
Bagenstos believes subtle acts of discrimination caused by implicit
biases accumulate to the disadvantage of minorities.6 5 Under this view,
the dearth of present evidence showing that implicit measures of bias
predict discriminatory behaviors at an observable level is not harmful to
normative claims based on implicit bias.66 A few points should be
emphasized with respect to that view.
First, relatively few published studies have found any correlation
between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior of any kind, subtle or
unsubtle. Second, a meta-analysis by the creators of the IAT found an
average correlation of r = 0.24 between IAT scores and behaviors
expansively defined to be indicators of racial stereotyping or racial
prejudice (for example, the meta-analysis includes studies in which
neurological responses to minority stimuli were the criterion
behaviors).67 If we accepted this estimate as reliable, the psychometric
64. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 490.
65. See id. at 481 n.23 ("As workplaces evolve into more flexible, less hierarchical
organizations, there is reason to believe that micro-level discriminatory behaviors will increasingly
aggregate to cause denials of opportunities, but the 'reason to believe' is not yet hard proof.")
(citation omitted); see also id. at 485 ("Whatever it reflects, implicit bias can result in behaviors and
evaluations that limit the opportunities of minority group members.").
66. See id. at 481 n.23 ("[T]he link between implicit bias and discriminatory behavior that
actually denies opportunities needs further development.").
67. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understandingand Using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 72, on file with the Hofstra Law Review). For IAT measures of sex bias and other
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fact that IAT scores have low positive correlations with behavior
expansively defined as discrimination would guarantee that many
individuals labeled implicitly biased by the IAT will not exhibit
discriminatory behavior of any kind. Third, to our knowledge no
published study examines implicit bias and behavior toward nonstrangers. While many important interactions will be between strangers
(for example, job interviews, new client contacts), many important
interactions also involve non-strangers, and one cannot reasonably
assume that implicit biases toward broad social groups will
automatically trump individualized associations with specific members
of these groups. Fourth, studies on the IAT-behavior linkage fail to find
a robust relationship between IAT scores and discriminatory behavior:
the findings of such studies appear to be sensitive to the influence of
outliers, and adding IAT scores to predictive models reduces prediction
errors by only very small amounts. 68 Thus, while it is possible that
evidence will develop supporting Bagenstos's cumulative disadvantage
hypothesis, Bagenstos correctly surmises that no hard proof yet exists to
69
support it.
Another possibility is that Bagenstos feels that data connecting
specific acts of discrimination to specific biased persons or organizations
is unnecessary because he wants to reframe the discrimination problem
as a matter of public health rather than individual fault or liability:
Science does not defeat the implicit bias law-reform program, but
science does not establish the case for that program, either. That

program depends on a normative judgment that discrimination is not
about fault but about a social problem-a normative judgment that is
deeply contested among judges and policymakers. Unfortunately,
arguments about implicit bias too often place heavy rhetorical
emphasis on appeals to "science," perhaps at the expense of
developing the normative arguments
for applying antidiscrimination
70
law to that important phenomenon.
Implicit bias in this view becomes a placeholder for the
innumerable subtle ways society favors historically advantaged groups
over historically disadvantaged groups. This view can be seen as a world
intergroup biases, the correlations between IAT scores and behavioral indicators of bias were lower.
See id. For discussion on prior versions of this meta-analysis, see Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., No
Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 279, 282

(2004) and Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 31, at 960; Kang & Banaji, supra note 27, at 1071-72.
68. See Blanton et al., supra note 40, at 17, 22-23, 30.
69. See supra note 40.
70. Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 491.
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view that operates at such a level of generality or abstraction, and
permits so many defensive moves when threatened, that7 1it becomes
difficult to refute using ordinary means of empirical testing.
Of course, one could endorse a move away from an actor-focused
model and toward a public health model of antidiscrimination law
without the prop of social scientific research on implicit bias-indeed,
Bagenstos has done so in the context of disability law 72-but to an
advocate of the public health model, the allure of the implicit bias
research is obvious: if this research demonstrates that discrimination
occurs at an unconscious level, then it supports the view that the old,
perpetrator-focused model cannot adequately address modem
discrimination. As we have pointed out, however, both controlled and
automatic psychological processes contribute to implicitly biased
responses on the IAT and the term "unconscious" is not synonymous
with "unmotivated." More generally, the jury remains out on exactly
what psychological processes give rise to "biased" responses on implicit
measures of bias and on how controllable these processes may be. Thus,
even at the most basic level, it is not clear that the science of implicit
bias supports the reform agenda that Bagenstos advocates.
In other words, Bagenstos's explicit agenda is to push
antidiscrimination law and theory toward a public-health model, and, to
the extent the new implicit bias work supports his agenda, he is happy to
embrace that work.73 But if that work turns out to be scientifically
flawed, then his reformist agenda risks being brought down with it.

71. Elsewhere we discuss the two polar positions within antidiscrimination theory that many
scholars are drawn toward. While some scholars advocate a statist-interventionist view that sees
discrimination as a natural and inevitable human activity that must be strictly regulated to be
controlled, others believe in a market-centered view that sees group-based discrimination as a taste
or rational reaction to others' tastes that can be eliminated or controlled through market means. We
also discuss how ordinary empirical tests of these competing positions should be replaced with
adversarial empirical collaborations. See Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Unconscious
Prejudiceand Accountability Systems: What Must OrganizationsDo to Prevent Discrimination?,in
29 RESEARCH INORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9-10, 42, on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
72. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 54-82
(2004) (arguing that solving the problems of disability law requires a social welfare approach). See
generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1479 (2001) (discussing risk regulation in the context of disability law and arguing
that public health agencies are in the best position to determine the interests of the disabled).
73. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 5-10 (discussing implicit bias research and the need
for a structural approach to combat this bias); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Trappedin the Feedback Loop:
A Response to ProfessorDays, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1007, 1009 (2005) ("Intentional discrimination
clearly remains an important problem, but there is an emerging consensus that implicit or
unconscious bias is becoming a more significant contributor to continuing workplace inequalities.").
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Accordingly, it becomes important to deflect our scientific attacks and to
cabin us as motivated defenders of the old, "perpetrator-focused" regime
so that the larger project of rethinking antidiscrimination law can
continue unscathed.74
In trying to rescue his value-driven agenda from its association with
a youthful science that may turn out to look very different as it ages,
Bagenstos ignores the underlying facts and reads into our article
normative claims that do not exist. 75 Acceptance of our scientific
criticisms does not depend on the acceptance of any particular normative
assumptions about antidiscrimination law. Some may find our criticisms
supportive of an intentional-level model of discrimination regulation and
unsupportive of a move to a public-health model of discrimination
regulation, as Bagenstos fears, but that would be a consequence of our
scientific critique, not a cause of it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Professor Bagenstos contends that we believe that implicit bias is
less morally or legally objectionable than explicit bias. But our argument
was never a normative one-with the noteworthy exception that we do
think it wrong to answer public policy questions with empirical research
that addresses other questions. Our central argument was simply that
implicit bias research fails to answer too many key questions and
remains too open to external-validity challenges to shoulder the heavy
descriptive and prescriptive burdens being placed on it. 76 Legal scholars
invoking implicit bias research to reform the law may well have noble
intentions, but the success of law guided by social scientific research
depends on the validity of the underlying research and its proper
application, not on the nobility of the reformer's intentions.
For those legal scholars whose normative positions on
antidiscrimination law do not hinge on the scientific validity of the
74. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 488 (equating our views with "what Alan Freedman [sic]
called the 'perpetrator perspective"'); id. at 491 ("Mitchell and Tetlock's argument likely will
resonate with many lawyers, judges, and policymakers. The justification that best fits
antidiscrimination doctrine is one that focuses, not on the individual fault of the discriminator, but
on the social harms of discrimination. But most people-even most policy actors-have not
internalized that justification.") (citation omitted).
75. We do not address here every detail of our arguments that we believe Bagenstos gets
wrong in his effort to negate our arguments. We would simply ask the reader to read each of our
original arguments carefully and in light of any clarifications we have offered here.
76. Thus, we fully agree with Bagenstos that the implicit bias research program should
proceed, but applications of this work should proceed with caution. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at
491.
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implicit bias research program-a group that we believe now includes
Bagenstos--our scientific concerns about implicit bias research should
not matter. Yet Bagenstos expends much effort trying to reduce our
scientific concerns to normative posturing, in hopes, he candidly admits,
of blunting any impact our critique might have on the reform agenda he
supports. We understand his concern that our critique of implicit bias
research may impede reformist efforts now aligned with the implicit bias
research program, but shooting the scientific messenger to protect his
normative agenda is not the proper approach. Although it may be more
frustrating for reformers in a hurry, the more sensible approach is to be
wary when social scientists who share one's reform agenda offer
research findings that dovetail conveniently with that agenda 77-because
the facts may ultimately prove less convenient than originally portrayed.

77. See, e.g., Beth Potier, Making Case for Concept of 'Implicit Prejudice': Extending the
Legal Definition of Discrimination, HARv. U. GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2004, at 9, available at
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/12.16/09-prejudice.html (describing the legal reform
project of which leading IAT researchers are a part).
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